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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates sentiment in the online conversation about the Ukrainian Euromaidan protests across 
a range of English- and Russian-language social and traditional media sources.  Results from this exploratory 
research show more support for the Euromaidan protests in Russian-language sources, including among 
sources  and  users  based  in  Russia,  than  originally  expected.  Sentiment  in  English-language  sources, 
including those located in the United States and United Kingdom, is more negative than anticipated given the 
rhetorical support among western governments for the Euromaidan protests.   However, social media content 
in Ukraine, the US, and the UK is more positive than traditional media outlets in those countries.   
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ON  NOVEMBER  21,  2013,  Ukrainian 
President Victor Yanukovich decided to pull 
out of talks to more closely align Ukraine with 
the  European  Union.    Instead,  he  chose  to 
foster closer ties with Russia and a Kremlin-
led  Eurasian  trade  union.    This  move 
immediately  sparked  outrage  among  those 
Ukrainians hoping for greater integration into 
Europe and led to a series of massive protests 
centered  in  Kiev’s  Maidan  Square.    A 
permanent protest presence also emerged as a 
tent city, and barricades to protect protesters 
from the Berkut riot police were erected.  
In  short  order,  the  protesters  adopted  the 
Twitter  hashtag  #euromaidan  as  their 
moniker.  Protests continued at various levels 
of  participation  and  intensity  until  late 
February,  when  violence  between  protesters 
and  the  Berkut  riot  police  escalated.    Hard 
core  oppositionists  stood  their  ground,  and 
President  Yanukovich  eventually  fled  the 
country, turning up days later in the southern 
Russian city of Rostov.  The president’s party 
quickly  abandoned  Yanukovich,  and  the 
Parliament  ushered  in  a  provisional 
government  and  issued  a  warrant  for 
Yanukovich’s arrest.  There was little time to 
reflect  on  the  Euromaidan  protests 
themselves, as they were quickly overcome by 
events such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
fighting  between  Ukraine  and  pro-Russian 
separatists in Ukraine’s eastern provinces, and 
most  recently  the  downing  of  Malaysia 
Airlines  Flight  17.      Yet  the  Euromaidan 
protests are worthy of study, given that they 
represent  another  successful  bottom-up 
protest movement aided by the Internet that 
led to the fall of a government seen as corrupt 
and acting against the interests of its citizens. 
The protests were in large part a debate within 
Ukraine  about  whether  the  country  should 
integrate more closely into the EU, or instead 
turn east and back towards Russia. In addition 
to the offline protest actions, online debates 
on  social  media  platforms  such  as  Twitter, 
blogs, Facebook, and forums were a key part 
of how the world saw the protests, as well as 
how Ukrainians themselves talked about the 
events.  To  investigate  these  dynamics,  this 
paper uses Crimson Hexagon to understand 
the  sentiment  in  the  online  conversation 
about the Ukrainian protests across a range of 
English-  and  Russian-language  social  and 
traditional media sources.  Results from this 
exploratory research show more support for 
the Euromaidan protests in Russian-language 
sources than originally expected, including in 
sources  located  within  Russia.  Sentiment  in 
English-language  sources,  including  those 
based in the US and UK, was more negative 
than  expected  given  the  rhetorical  support 
among  western  governments  for  the 
Ukrainian protests.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This paper investigates the following research 
questions: 
 
1.  Given the interests of the EU, the US, 
and  Russia  in  the  outcome  of  the 
protests  and  the  direction  toward 
which  Ukraine  would  eventually 
gravitate,  are  English-language  social 
and traditional media more supportive 
of the protests than Russian-language 
sources?   
 
2.  How does this support or criticism of 
the protests and protesters vary over 
time?   
 
3.  Among Russian-language sources, are 
Ukraine-based  sources  more 
supportive of the protests than those 
based in Russia?    
 
4.  Are US- and UK-based sources more 
supportive of the protests than those 
based in Ukraine or Russia? 
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METHODS AND DATA 
This study uses data and software provided by 
Crimson  Hexagon,  which  relies  on  an 
algorithm  and  method  created  by  Hopkins 
and  King  (2010).    This  method  consists  of 
manually  coding  a  small,  nonrandom  subset 
of  stories  into  categories  of  interest:  in  this 
case,  posts  that  are  supportive,  critical,  or 
neutral  with  respect  to  the  protests,  or 
irrelevant.  The algorithm then reports on the 
proportion  of  categories  (again:  positive, 
negative, neutral, or irrelevant) found in the 
entire text corpus.  For a detailed description 
of  the  method  see  the  Hopkins  and  King 
paper cited above.  For an overview and some 
applications see the work with the platform by 
Pew’s  Project  for  Excellence  in  Journalism 
(Hitlin  2013).  For  an  application  to  foreign 
language content see King, Pan, and Roberts 
(2013).    
 
A  series  of  what  Crimson  Hexagon  calls 
monitors were created to assess the sentiment 
in  online  conversations  and  news  stories 
about  the  protests.    This  involved  the 
following steps:   
 
1.  Selecting  a  time  period  and  media 
sources  or  platforms  to  include  (i.e., 
Twitter,  Facebook,  forums,  blogs, 
etc.).  The date range for all monitors 
used  in  this  paper  is  November  21, 
2013,  when  Yanukovich  decided  to 
end  talks  with  the  EU,  through 
February  26,  2014,  the  approximate 
date  when  Yanukovich  left  the 
country  and  other  demands  of  the 
protesters were largely met, including 
the  selection  of  a  date  for  new 
elections.  
 
2.  Creating a Boolean search string with 
terms  that  represent  the  topic  of 
interest. This string will pull relevant 
posts from Crimson’s large data set of 
social  media  and  news  content  for 
coding. 
3.  Training  the  algorithm  by  coding  a 
random  set  of  posts  into  positive, 
neutral,  and  negative  sentiment 
categories,  as  well  as  an  irrelevant 
category.   
 
Approximately  30-45  posts  were  coded  into 
each sentiment category, well above the 20-
post  minimum  recommended  by  Crimson 
Hexagon.    Posts  coded  as  positive  included 
those  that  were  overtly  supportive  of  the 
protests, pro-EU, critical of Yanukovich and 
violence  by  the  Ukrainian  police  (including 
the  Berkut  riot  police),  and  posts  that  were 
critical  of  Russia,  Putin,  and  the  Russian 
government’s  policy  towards  the  protests.  
Posts  coded  as  neutral  included  those  that 
simply shared ‘headline’ type announcements 
about protests occurring in Ukraine as well as 
those  that  did  not  offer  overt  support  or 
criticism  of  the  protests  or  protesters.  
Negative  posts  included  those  that  were 
overtly  critical  of  the  protests,  that 
emphasized  nationalist  leadership  in  the 
protests  or  used  language  about  fascism, 
Nazis,  and  Hitler  to  describe  the  protesters 
and  protest  leaders,  were  anti-EU,  pro-
Russian, and those that stated that protesters 
were paid for and organized by the West.   
 
In  summary,  posts  were  coded  for  overt 
positive  and  negative  sentiment,  but  an 
attempt  was  not  made  to  distinguish  fine 
shades of meaning.  This conservative training 
of  the  algorithm  was  intended  to  identify 
sentiment  that  was  clearly  supportive  or 
critical of the protests.  Taking into account 
more nuance in the framing and discussion of 
protests would likely have led to more content 
falling into those sentiment categories and out 
of the neutral category.  As recommended by 
Crimson  Hexagon,  the  best  examples  of 
sentiment that could be found were selected 
for each category of interest, and categories 
needed to be mutually exclusive.   As this is an 
exploratory  study,  only  one  bilingual 
researcher trained the monitor, and reliability 
tests  were  not  conducted.    Results  could 3  Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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certainly  vary  depending  on  who  trains  the 
algorithm.   
 
One issue that arose with Crimson Hexagon’s 
Russian-language  data  is  that  many  news 
websites  pulled  in  irrelevant  headlines,  ads, 
and other text content from windows outside 
the main story text.  An additional category 
for  this  type  of  ‘mixed  content’  was  coded 
(represented  typically  by  a  series  of  news 
headlines  or  story  summaries,  only  one  of 
which  was  related  to  the  Ukraine  protests.)  
To further prevent this type of content from 
biasing the results, the data from websites that 
most typically included this type of mixed or 
irrelevant content (the ‘worst offenders’) were 
also  removed.    This  is  unfortunate,  since 
several  of  these  were  top  Russian  news 
sources  such  as  NTV,  which  one  would 
expect to have very pro-Russian frames that 
were opposed to the protests.  The Russian 
news  results  are  therefore  possibly 
underestimating  the  amount  of  negative 
content.   
DATA 
The  main  sources  of  data  used  for  the 
English-  and  Russian-language  monitors  are 
the text of Twitter (the full firehouse), blogs, 
news,  forums,  and  Facebook.    Filtering  by 
country is currently only available for Twitter, 
forums,  and  Facebook,  so  the  monitors  for 
sources  based  in  Ukraine  and  Russia  were 
limited  to  those  three  platforms,  and  the 
training  data  was  limited  to  those  sources.  
Crimson Hexagon does not currently include 
Ukrainian-language  sources,  so  a  monitor 
could not be created for this language, but this 
could  be  an  interesting  area  for  future 
research.  One would assume that content in 
Ukrainian, which is spoken more frequently in 
western  Ukraine  than  elsewhere  in  the 
country,  would  be  more  supportive  of  the 
protests than Russian-language content.    
  
FINDINGS 
COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH- AND RUSSIAN-
LANGUAGE SOURCES 
The  first  research  question  seeks  to 
understand  if  English-language  content  is 
more supportive of the protests than Russian-
language  content,  and  to  explore  whether 
there  are  differences  over  time  between  the 
language  groups.  Although  Ukrainians  also 
speak  Russian,  Russia  has  a  much  larger 
population and has more Internet users. The 
hypothesis  is  that  a  majority  of  Russian-
language  sources  will  follow  the  Russian 
government’s policy preference and be more 
critical  of  the  protests.    To  drill  down  to 
sentiment  by  location,  in  the  next  section, 
Russian-language sources based in Ukraine are 
compared to those based in Russia, as well as 
to English-language sources based in the US 
and UK.    
 
As all of the charts in this paper show, there 
are three major phases to the protests, which 
theoretically could be linked to what Tarrow 
(1998) calls ‘cycles of contention.’  The first 
phase  occurs  from  late  November  and  into 
late December and includes the abandonment 
of  the  EU  negotiations,  the  first  major 
protests,  including  one  with  an  estimated 
crowd of 800,000 in early December, and the 
establishment of a tent city on Maidan Square.  
Online discussion and debate then cools off 
during  the  holidays  and  New  Year 
celebrations,  especially  in  English-language 
sources.   
 
The  second  phase  lasts  from  approximately 
January  20  to  February  3.    This  phase 
included  the  passage  of  a  restrictive  protest 
law  by  the  Ukrainian  parliament,  the  first 
violence and deaths at the protests, the death 
of a high profile activist, Yuriy Verbytsky, the 
storming  of  regional  government  offices  in 
Western  Ukraine,  the  resignation  of  Prime 
Minister Mykola Azarov, and the passage of a 
broad amnesty law.     Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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The third, final, and most intense period of 
discussion online begins around February 17 
and lasts through the end of the analysis in 
this paper on February 26.  This final phase 
coincides with the greatest level of violence, 
including  major  clashes  between  protesters 
and the Berkut police force on February 18 
that led to the death of 18 people, including 7 
police, and attempts by the police to encircle 
and  then  clear  Maidan  Square.    The  worst 
spate  of  violence  occurred  around  February 
20, when 88 people were killed in a 48-hour 
period,  and  snipers  also  opened  fire  on 
protesters.    On  February 2 2 ,  Yanukovich 
disappeared,  protesters  stormed  the 
presidential  administration,  parliament 
removed the president from power and set a 
date  for  new  elections,  and  opposition 
politician  Yulia  Tymoshenko  was  released 
from prison.  During the period of February 
23-26,  parliament  named  an  interim  speaker 
and president and issued an arrest warrant for 
Yanukovich,  and  the  Berkut  police  unit 
blamed  for  violence  against  protesters  was 
disbanded (BBC 2014).  
 
A  comparison  of  the  number  of  posts 
between  the  two  languages  shows  over 
100,000 more posts in English than in Russian 
(385,971 English; 273,648 Russian).  This is 
not  surprising  given  the  significantly  larger 
number  of  English-language  Internet  users.  
The  first  phase  of  the  protests  garners  a 
higher  and  more  sustained  level  of  interest 
among Russian-language users.  The highest 
peak in volume for both language groups is in 
the third and final phase.  In general, English-
language volume rises and drops off quickly, 
while  the  Russian-language  sources  tend  to 
show a more sustained level of interest across 
the three phases.  The second phase is also 
marked  by  a    sustained  level  of  consistent 
discussion of the protests in Russian-language 
sources, although the overall volume is lower 
compared to English.   
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Media sources 
A  comparison  of  sources  across  the  two 
languages shows that blogs make up a much 
larger proportion of posts in Russian (23%) 
compared to English (just 5% of content).   It 
appears that blogs, which are primarily from 
the  LiveJournal  platform,  are  still  an 
important part of the networked public sphere 
on the Russian-speaking Internet.  It is also 
clear that Twitter accounts for a majority of 
posts in both languages, but this is somewhat 
misleading, as a short tweet of 140 characters 
or  fewer  is  not  really  comparable  to  a  blog 
post, forum post, or newspaper article, which 
typically  tend  to  be  much  longer  and  more 
time  consuming  to  create.    The  amount  of 
text  generated  on  Facebook  might  also 
understate  the  importance  of  that  platform 
for  protest  movements,  especially 
coordination  pages.    Activity  on  Facebook, 
for  example,  might  be  better  measured  by 
‘likes’  or  the  number  of  links  pointing  to  a 
coordination  page  than  by  the  number  of 
posts.   
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: ENGLISH- AND RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE SOURCES 
 
Sentiment 
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The  first  major  takeaway  regarding 
sentiment is that a majority of the content in 
both  languages  falls  into  the  neutral 
category,  which  means  reporting  in  a 
balanced  or  neutral  way,  or  just  in  a 
‘headline’  fashion  that  does  not  really 
express  any  opinion.    For  example  the 
algorithm identified these posts as neutral, 
which fits well with the initial training posts: 
 
Ukraine protests grow as president 
responds 
http://t.co/Z6RJxK08QN 
 
Days of Protest in Ukraine In Focus 
- The Atlantic 
http://t.co/SaRRF1W7mO  
 
Overall,  English  content  is  more  negative 
than Russian content.   Here is an example 
of negative content drawn from a day when 
protests turned violent in December:  
 
US, EU are ‘neck deep’ in plan to 
see pro-Western regime change in 
#Ukraine 
http://t.co/uK3Ir71TDb #US 
#EU #NATO behind #Ukraine 
protests. 
 
US, #EU ignore inconvenient Nazi, 
white power flags and symbols in 
#Ukraine 'protests' 
http://t.co/VHq2ik62xI 
 
Here  are  two  examples  of  posts  with 
positive sentiment or framing in support of 
protests, drawn from the same day: 
 
Ukrainian protests turn violent, 
Yanukovych attacks instead of 
listening to pleas for democracy! 
http://t.co/YuNDQygCnT 
#euromaidan 
 
I went to Kiev last week for 8 days 
and took some pictures of a very 
peaceful Maidan. It is very sad to see 
all the violence, and how this 
beautiful place is burning. All I have 
personally seen was peaceful 
protests and a wide range of 
different Ukrainians concerned 
about the future of their country. I 
wish the Ukrainian people the very 
best. Let's hope they will succeed in 
bringing down this kleptocratic 
government. 
http://imgur.com/a/fwUmZ#0 
 
Russian-language sources are more positive 
than  negative,  while  English  sources  are 
overall  a  bit  more  negative  than  positive.  
Both  these  findings  are  at  odds  with  this 
paper’s  original  hypothesis.    In  the  below 
images,  the  Russian-  and  English-language 
results  are  limited  to  only  positive  and 
negative sentiment across time to highlight 
differences and similarities.  It appears that 
the  Russian-language  content  is  more 
positive in the first phase and grows more 
negative  over  time,  with  negative  content 
becoming more frequent in the final phase 
of the protests.  One hypothesis that might 
explain this shift is the amount of violence 
that  took  place  in  the  last  phase  of  the 
protests,  which  fit  well  with  the  Russian 
government’s frame that the protests would 
lead to violence, chaos, and blood on the 
streets.    English-language  content  does 
become more positive at the very end of the 
final phase of the protests, which is likely a 
reflection  of  the  success  of  the  protesters 
and the departure of Yanukovich.   7  Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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FIGURE 4A: RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE SENTIMENT OVER TIME 
 
FIGURE 4B: RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE SENTIMENT VOLUME 
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FIGURE 5B: ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SENTIMENT VOLUME 
 
 
 
COUNTRY-BASED TWITTER, FACEBOOK, 
AND FORUMS  
How  did  Russian-language  users  based  in 
Russia talk about the protests compared to 
those  based  in  Ukraine?    How  does  this 
differ  from  sources  based  in  the  US  and 
UK, which are the source of most English-
language  content  in  the  English-language 
monitors  referenced  above?    This  paper’s 
working  hypothesis  is  that  Ukraine-based 
users and sources will be more supportive 
than those based in Russia.  As mentioned 
in the methods section, Crimson Hexagon 
only allows filtering by country for Twitter, 
forums,  and  Facebook,  so  news  and  blog 
content is not included in the below results.  
These  results  therefore  are  more 
representative of social media content than 
traditional media content.   
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: UKRAINE, RUSSIA, AND US & UK SOURCE VOLUME 
 
Looking  first  at  source  volume  across 
platforms  and  countries,  Twitter  remains 
the major source of content in all countries.  
However,  forums  account  for  18%  of 
content  in  Russia  and  almost  half  of  the 
posts (46%) in Ukraine.  For all countries, 
Facebook accounts for a small amount of 
posts (no greater than 2%). 
 9  Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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FIGURE 7: SENTIMENT IN UKRAINE COMPARED TO RUSSIA AND THE US & UK 
 
The results show that sentiment on social 
media in Ukraine is largely positive (47%), a 
substantial  amount  of  content  (37%)  is 
neutral,  and  just  16%  is  negative.    Social 
media content in the US and UK is even 
more positive than in Ukraine (55%), with 
about an equal amount of neutral content as 
in  Ukraine  (35%).  For  Russia-based  social 
media content, most of the sentiment again 
falls  into  the  neutral  category,  while  the 
supportive content (16%) is about equal to 
that  critical  of  the  protests  (15%).    The 
social  media  findings  for  Ukraine  and  the 
US and UK, therefore, provide support for 
the hypothesis laid out at the beginning of 
the  paper,  while  Russian  social  media  is 
more  neutral  than  expected.    In  the  next 
charts,  the  neutral  content  is  pulled  out 
from  all  monitors  to  allow  a  focus  on 
positive  and  negative  sentiment  from 
Ukraine and Russia. 
   Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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FIGURE 8: SENTIMENT OF UKRAINE-BASED SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
 
FIGURE 9: SENTIMENT OF RUSSIA-BASED SOCIAL MEDIA 11  Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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FIGURE 10: SENTIMENT OF US- & UK-BASED SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
This  data  shows  that  discussion  online  in 
both  Ukraine  and  Russia  is  more  positive 
than  negative,  although  Ukraine-based 
content  is  significantly  more  positive  than 
content in Russia, and is supportive of the 
protests throughout all three major protest 
phases.  The Russia-based sources show a 
peak  of  supportive  sentiment  early  in  the 
protests,  while  there  are  more  negative 
peaks towards the later part of the second 
phase of the protests and during the third 
and final phase.   
 
The US- and UK-based sources, similar to 
Ukraine-based  sources,  show  a  clear 
majority  of  posts  falling  into  the  positive 
category (55%).  In fact, data from US and 
UK Twitter, forums, and Facebook has the 
largest share of positive sentiment of all the 
monitors.  The highest volume of positive 
content for these two countries is found in 
the  second  phase  of  the  Euromaidan 
protests.  
 
It is also worth highlighting the differences 
between  the  sentiment  on  social  media 
(Twitter, forums, and Facebook) compared 
to the overall English- and Russian-language 
results,  which  also  include  news  and  blog 
content.  In Ukraine, the sentiment is much 
more positive on social media than in the 
overall  results.    Social  media  in  Russia  is 
somewhat more opinionated, but a little less 
positive.  In the US and UK, social media 
on this topic is more opinionated and more 
positive  in  sentiment  than  in  the  overall   Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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results.    In  the  US  and  UK  this  finding 
might be explained by removing the news 
content,  which  in  general  is  more  neutral.  
However,  it  is  also  possible  that  this 
difference is an artifact of different training 
of  the  algorithm,  since  the  social  media 
monitors were trained with data exclusively 
from Twitter, forums, and Facebook.   
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This exploratory research shows that there 
was more support online in Russia for the 
Ukraine  protests  than  one  might  expect.  
This  may  be  explained  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
previous  research  has  shown  that  online 
political  speech  in  Russia  is  more 
oppositional  than  supportive  of  the 
Kremlin,  and  that  online  sources  used  by 
bloggers  that  discuss  politics  tend  to  be 
more  oppositional  than  supportive  of  the 
government (Etling et al.).  This data also 
does  not  include  discussion  of  Crimea, 
where the government’s position may have      
enjoyed more support within Russia.  It is 
also  interesting  that  Russian-language 
sources in Ukraine are so supportive of the 
protests.  This may be explained by the fact 
that many Ukrainians use both Russian and 
Ukrainian, and that language may not divide 
the  country  as  clearly  as  many  press 
accounts may have us believe.  However, it 
is also possible that these early results point 
towards  more  support  among  Russian-
speaking  Ukrainians  for  the  protests  than 
the  Russian  government  and  mainstream 
media  claimed.    Much  additional  research 
would be needed to confirm this, but it is an 
interesting early finding.  Finally, there was 
less  support  among  English-language 
sources  for  the  protests  than  originally 
assumed.      This  may  be  explained  by  the 
frequent finding in communication research 
that, at least in the US, news content overall 
tends  to  be  negative  (i.e.,  “If  it  bleeds,  it 
leads”).  Indeed, when the data relied upon 
for sentiment removes news sources and is 
purely  based  on  social  media  content 
(Twitter,  forums,  and  Facebook),  US  and 
UK  sources  are  more  supportive  than 
critical of the Euromaidan protests.  
 
There are many fruitful pathways for future 
research.    Beyond  confirming  or  refuting 
the early results from this study, interesting 
avenues  of  research  include  understanding 
differences  in  conversation  and  framing 
over Crimea, the role that violence plays in 
support or criticism online for protests, how 
closely social media sentiment tracks that of 
traditional  news  sources  in  the  US 
compared  to  Ukraine  and  Russia,  and  a 
comparison  of  Ukrainian-language  content 
and  Russian-language  content  among 
sources  and  users  within  Ukraine  proper.  
Finally,  since  knowing  what  communities 
are  active  online  and  how  they  engage  in 
conversation over protests is essential, the 
need  to  combine  social  network  analysis 
with automated text analysis is a critical next 
step for this type of research.    13  Russia, Ukraine, and the West: Social Media Sentiment in the Euromaidan Protests 
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